Skip to main content

Twenty percent of all households have at least one bot-infected computer

...and 5% of all enterprise 'assets' are infected.

From Gunter Ollmann, VP of Research at Damballa in this post on CircleID:
"...on average, between 3-7% of assets within enterprise networks are identified as being infected..."
"Within the ISP/Telco world that have chosen to deploy the Damballa CSP product, between 18-22% of unique subscriber IP addresses are actively seeking to connect to known C&C servers."
Ouch.

Note that this is bot-net infections only, not the broader category of computers infected with malware in general. 

When I first started securing systems a couple decades ago there were no external threats. We had Netware, IPX and Arcnet. The only path to a compromise of confidentiality or integrity originated on a keyboard withing the campus. There were no external threats. The threat to our systems was from the inside, and the risk from insiders was mitigated by the assumption that we'd be able to pin the actions initiated a keyboard inside our buildings to an individual and that the individual would know that the actions would be traceable. It wasn't foolproof - you routinely read about employees misappropriating employers funds - but as far as I know, it was a manageable problem.

Then we connected our wonderful safe little island to the Internet. It didn't take long to figure out that an action by an outsider, external to our island, was a threat to our systems. The solution? Firewalls, of course. If the outsider can't get in, we can focus on the threat from the inside where we know who is at the keyboard, where they know that we know, and where they know that detection and prosecution is a likely outcome.

Today? Unlike years ago, we cannot associate the actions of a keyboard with the individual sitting at the keyboard. This effectively means that what used to be external is now internal, and what has always been internal is now external. What used to be a fairly clear delineation between something that happened from the outside and something that happened internally is gone. We no longer can assert that we know who is at any particular keyboard, and tracing an event back to an internal keyboard doesn't permit us to presume that the action was initiated by a person internal to the organization.

The external threat is inside your enterprise.



Comments

  1. just for fun, did a clamav scan on a 3 year old usb drive that had support files from hp. am pretty fastidious about nothing downloaded without scanning, nothing run unless checksummed.
    clamav smelled bad fish in there. I have had similar experiences with opening up backed up data that was scanned by symantec as it was archived, a couple of years later scanned as it was restored, and had trojan files that were not detected on the initial archival activity.
    Is it any wonder that we have bot infested sea of clients?
    One may well wonder what sort of sleeping devils live on embedded systems, cell phones, firmware, cmos. Who is checking?

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Cargo Cult System Administration

“imitate the superficial exterior of a process or system without having any understanding of the underlying substance” --Wikipedia During and after WWII, some native south pacific islanders erroneously associated the presence of war related technology with the delivery of highly desirable cargo. When the war ended and the cargo stopped showing up, they built crude facsimiles of runways, control towers, and airplanes in the belief that the presence of war technology caused the delivery of desirable cargo. From our point of view, it looks pretty amusing to see people build fake airplanes, runways and control towers  and wait for cargo to fall from the sky.The question is, how amusing are we?We have cargo cult science[1], cargo cult management[2], cargo cult programming[3], how about cargo cult system management?Here’s some common system administration failures that might be ‘cargo cult’:Failing to understand the difference between necessary and sufficient. A daily backup is necessary, b…

Ad-Hoc Verses Structured System Management

Structured system management is a concept that covers the fundamentals of building, securing, deploying, monitoring, logging, alerting, and documenting networks, servers and applications. Structured system management implies that you have those fundamentals in place, you execute them consistently, and you know all cases where you are inconsistent. The converse of structured system management is what I call ad hoc system management, where every system has it own plan, undocumented and inconsistent, and you don't know how inconsistent they are, because you've never looked.

In previous posts (here and here) I implied that structured system management was an integral part of improving system availability. Having inherited several platforms that had, at best, ad hoc system management, and having moved the platforms to something resembling structured system management, I've concluded that implementing basic structure around system management will be the best and fastest path to …

The Cloud – Provider Failure Modes

In The Cloud - Outsourcing Moved up the Stack[1] I compared the outsourcing that we do routinely (wide area networks) with the outsourcing of the higher layers of the application stack (processor, memory, storage). Conceptually they are similar:
In both cases you’ve entrusted your bits to someone else, you’ve shared physical and logical resources with others, you’ve disassociated physical devices (circuits or servers) from logical devices (virtual circuits, virtual severs), and in exchange for what is hopefully better, faster, cheaper service, you give up visibility, manageability and control to a provider. There are differences though. In the case of networking, your cloud provider is only entrusted with your bits for the time it takes for those bits to cross the providers network, and the loss of a few bits is not catastrophic. For providers of higher layer services, the bits are entrusted to the provider for the life of the bits, and the loss of a few bits is a major problem. The…